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That the nature of international security changed fundamentally on a single day is now 
taken for granted. When those hijacked aircraft were flown into buildings in New York 
and Washington (and into the ground at Shanksville, Pennsylvania), the catastrophe was 
to lead, at least in some circles, to a profound change in the ways security was discussed. 
At least, this is the conventional wisdom. Of course, it could be pointed out that western 
security thinking has an interesting history of being ‗shocked‘ into change by singular 
events: the massacre of Srebrenica, the fall of the Berlin Wall, the launch of Sputnik, the 
annihilation of Hiroshima—all had similar effects on ‗our‘ thinking. Western security 
thinking, at least since the end of the Second World War, has seemed to rely on ‗shocks‘ 
for its evolution. But with 9/11, the world had self-evidently changed. Who could 
disagree with such a proposition? All we can do is try to catch up, and to get on top of 
those changes. Such is the conventional wisdom. 
 Yet it is wrong—for policy now, as well as for academic debate—to consider the 
events of 9/11 simply in this way. The ‗war on terror‘ was a deliberate political choice 
taken by western political leaders, and they could have fashioned other responses. That 
those events in September 2001 would produce a political response on the part of the US 
is clear (and was undoubtedly clear to those who planned the attacks). But that response 
did not have to be the ‗war on terror‘. There were choices for the US, for the UK, and 
indeed for the West as a whole. 
 For the US, the shock was all the more profound because of the (false) sense that 
the US homeland had been immune from attack, including attack from terrorism. This 
was false not only in the context of the Oklahoma City bombing, but also given a whole 
host of other terrorist attacks in the US in the 1990s, including at the Atlanta Olympic 
Games, and in the derailing (by bombing) of a train in Arizona. But in the predominant 
security narratives these were not really significant events, because these terrorists were 
seen as ‗lone wolves‘—indeed, such actions were not always deemed to be terrorism. 
With 9/11, a new terrorist organisation (Al-Qaeda) was called into central view. 
 In Britain, policy-makers had been dealing not only with IRA terrorism, but also 
with a host of other terrorist organizations, some of which acted largely within the 
territorial confines of Northern Ireland while others, including animal liberation and far 
right-wing terrorists, acted across the UK and indeed also, on occasion, internationally. In 
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envisioning the ‗war on terror‘, American policy-makers saw a single threat narrative of 
terrorism, which is why it was possible, in his speech to Congress on 20 September 2001, 
for President Bush to say: ‗And we will pursue nations that provide aid or safe haven to 
terrorism. Every nation in every region now has a decision to make: Either you are with 
us or you are with the terrorists. From this day forward, any nation that continues to 
harbor or support terrorism will be regarded by the United States as a hostile regime.‘1 
No-one working on international security and counterterrorism in the UK, in either the 
policy or the academic community, would have made such a statement in, say, August 
2001; terrorism was simply understood differently. But in choosing to respond to the 
attacks with the political and military strategy of the ‗war on terror‘, such complexity was 
removed, and a new, singular threat was put in its place.
2
 
 Americans and Britons understood the threat narrative differently from the very 
start of the ‗age of terror‘. Indeed, that very term—the ‗age of terror‘—precisely captures 
the difference. With a history of atrocity in places as distinct as Birmingham, Guildford, 
Belfast, Enniskillen, Warrington, Omagh and London (which experienced 14 separate 
attacks in over 20 years up to the Belfast Agreement, and four more after it), all in the 
period from the early 1970s to 9/11, the ascription of that title to a new period was, to 
British and Irish ears, jarring. Americans, though, felt in the wreckage of September 11th 
a loss of invulnerability, and so ‗age of terror‘ was precisely the key description in the 
United States. As Strobe Talbott and Nayan Chanda put it: 
 
We‘ve never had a good name for it, and now it‘s over. The post-cold war era—let us call it that 
for want of any better term—began with the collapse of one structure, the Berlin Wall, on 
                                                 
1
 Transcript of President Bush‟s address to a joint session of Congress on 20 Sept. 2001, 
broadcast on CNN, 21 Sept. 2001, 
http://edition.cnn.com/2001/US/09/20/gen.bush.transcript/, accessed {?}Jan. 2010. 
2
 Stuart Croft, Culture, crisis and America’s war on terror (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2006). 
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November 9, 1989, and ended with the collapse of another, the World Trade Center‘s Twin 
Towers on September 11, 2001 . . . everyone acknowledged that everything had changed.
3
 
 
The title of their book, written immediately after 9/11 and published in January 2002, 
expressed this perfectly: The age of terror: America and the world after September 11th. 
America had declared the new age: and that declaration would structure security and 
foreign policy for the world. For the UK, that would mean that counterterrorism policy, 
broadly expressed, would be framed far more by the American agenda that it would be by 
Britain‘s own experiences in struggles with terrorists. 
 With the declaration of the ‗war on terror‘, focus was trained on the threat 
narrative to America and the West. But it is the contention of this article that there have 
been a series of threat narratives; that one of the characteristics of the ‗age of terror‘ has 
been our failure at a political and public level to agree on what the threat is. As a 
consequence, we have failed to agree on the name of the enemy: is it ‗Al-Qaeda‘, 
‗Islamo-fascism‘, ‗Islamism‘, ‗Islamic terrorism‘? All have been tried and, for different 
reasons, found wanting as descriptors. We have failed to establish a counterterrorism 
narrative that would persuasively and over time convincingly show linkages between 
operations in Iraq, the West Midlands, Afghanistan and Glasgow; and for some British 
citizens, a counternarrative—of Britain ‗crusading‘ against the Muslim world—has taken 
hold. That which constitutes ‗threat‘ has changed in our minds over the past decade. 
 This article examines these issues by first looking at four distinct though 
overlapping notions of the threat posed to the West, and to the UK, in debates about 
counterterrorism since 9/11. One considered Al-Qaeda to be a central organization, 
perhaps akin to the Red Army in the Cold War: a military machine conducting hostile 
operations. Another viewed the threat in network terms, as being decentralized, with a 
number of local cells operating strategically in common but distinctly in tactical terms. 
Yet another focused on the ‗home-grown‘ threat, in which radicalized young people are 
drawn into terrorism by ideologues outside mosques or via the internet; here, Al-Qaeda‘s 
role could be seen as more analogous to the Comintern in Cold War days. Finally, there 
                                                 
3
 Strobe Talbott and Nayan Chanda, The age of terror: American and the world after 
September 11th (New York: Basic Books, 2002), p. 3. 
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has been the apocalyptic threat, with a focus on the perceived determination of the ‗new 
terrorism‘ to inflict extraordinary damage through the use of weapons of mass 
destruction. 
 The second section of the article asks the simple question: so what is new about 
this ‗age of terror‘? Clearly, terrorism has been a feature of international and domestic 
life for centuries: the concept was first articulated by Robespierre in the French 
Revolution, allowing us to date the beginning of a longer ‗age of terror‘, yet what we 
would recognize as acts of terrorism were certainly committed before that time.
4
 What 
are the new features? How important are aspects such as the internet and Web 2.0, mobile 
phones and new technology? These are clearly important operational issues, but how do 
they impact upon how we think of contemporary terrorist threats? We ask: is there a new 
and immediate threat—or is that which is new the nature of our own fears? 
 
Four threat narratives 
British counterterrorism policy has traditionally sought to understand the nature of the 
threat that was being faced.
5
 Over time, there have been quite clearly a series of 
counterterrorism failures, here conceived of not as intelligence failures, but as community 
failures, lessons learnt by the British state. Internment in Northern Ireland in the early 
1970s was a disaster; so were the police investigation into the pub bombings, leading to 
miscarriages of justice for the Maguire Seven, the Birmingham Six and the Guildford 
Four, and the H-Block policy and the handling of the hunger strikes in the early 1980s. 
Over a decade or so, successive initiatives had only led to a widening and deepening of 
that threat: through failure in policy and practice, the British had actually expanded the 
threat. But there was a process of reflection and learning in London and Belfast; and there 
                                                 
4
 See e.g. Bruce Hoffman, Inside terrorism, 2nd rev. edn (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 2006), pp. 3–4; Albert Parry, Terrorism from Robespierre to Arafat 
(New York: Vanguard, 1976). 
5
 The British counterterror strategy that emerged after 9/11 is known as CONTEST. 
Details can be found at the Home Office website, 
http://security.homeoffice.gov.uk/counter-terrorism-strategy/, accessed {?} March 2010. 
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followed a period of real operational success, not only with regard to Northern Ireland, 
but also in connection with preventing terrorist attacks by far right groups and others in 
the 1980s and 1990s. Reflection, learning, and getting to know the people, local context 
and organizations: these were key practices of British counterterrorism by the early 
1990s. After 2001, the ‗war on terror‘ was overlaid on this culture and practice and, for a 
period, obscured them, so that there was a period of ‗unlearning‘. As well as reflection, 
learning and local context there came ‗macro‘ ideas from the US that led to different 
types of threat coming into focus at different times. 
 This section will examine how each of the four types of threat identified above 
was seen. The purpose is not to provide evidence or argument that one or more of these 
narratives is in any objective sense ‗wrong‘, nor to assert that the ‗real‘ nature of 
terrorism can be understood outside narratives. Rather, the focus in this article is to 
understand the nature of the contestation about the nature of ‗threat‘, an issue that has to 
be absolutely core to any counterterrorism strategy and practice. 
 
AQ Central 
The first threat narrative, that emerging from the attacks of 9/11, focused on the idea of a 
centralized, global terrorist threat: a narrative that strongly underpinned the Bush 
Administration‘s response to 9/11. Rather than see the attackers as criminal, they were 
understood as (illegitimate) soldier-terrorists following the orders of the leader. Hence, a 
terrorist attack could be faced by invading and changing the government of another state: 
rather than seeing 9/11 as a transnational issue, it became a state to state challenge. But 
that idea—of Al-Qaeda having central command over a global strategy, that of the 
leadership of ‗AQ Central‘—became important in the United Kingdom not least because 
the Prime Minister was convinced by it. Tony Blair told the 2004 Labour Party 
conference that 
 
There are two views of what is happening in the world today. One view is that there are isolated 
individuals, extremists, engaged in essentially isolated acts of terrorism. That what is happening 
is not qualitatively different from the terrorism we have always lived with . . . The other view is 
that this is a wholly new phenomenon, worldwide global terrorism based on a perversion of the 
true, peaceful and honourable faith of Islam; that its roots are not superficial but deep, in the 
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madrassehs of Pakistan, in the extreme forms of Wahhabi doctrine in Saudi Arabia, in the former 
training camps of Al Qaeda in Afghanistan; in the cauldron of Chechnya; in parts of the politics 
of most countries of the Middle East and many in Asia; in the extremist minority that now in 
every European city preach hatred of the West and our way of life.
6
 
 
In this view, there were an ideology (‗extreme forms of Wahhabi doctrine‘), sites of 
ideological development (‗in the madrassehs of Pakistan‘), and sites held by that ideology 
that would be the hubs of attempts at revolutionary change (‗Saudi Arabia‘, 
‗Afghanistan‘, ‗Chechnya‘—indeed, ‗most countries of the Middle East and many in 
Asia‘—and ‗in every European city‘). For Blair, this was a global campaign, from which 
only the Americas were (at the moment) bastions against the new central threat. As he 
also said, ‗September 11th changed the world; . . . Bali, Beslan, Madrid and scores of 
other atrocities that never make the news are part of the same threat‘.7 
 It is of course important to realize that there was nothing specifically British about 
this view; it was an idea that was deeply embedded in responses across the West. The 
attacks of 9/11 were coordinated and delivered with, apparently, great skill; surely that 
was evidence of a strong organization? Perhaps. But this analysis also reflected two 
underlying views. The first was that only a ‗great opponent‘ could land such a 
devastating blow on the continental United States; that America was so powerful as 
surely to be vulnerable only to a similarly powerful entity. That is, there was also a 
(western/American) cultural proclivity to understand ‗threat‘ as centralized. The second, 
rooted in the political and cultural experience of the twentieth century, was that great 
threats were controlled tightly and centrally, as in the long struggle with the Soviet Union 
during the Cold War, or with Nazism in the decades before that. In other words, ‗we‘ 
were in a sense conditioned to see the threat as centralized and powerful. This 
interpretation was perhaps most pronounced in literal and figurative representations of 
the ‗AQ Central‘ model, which was published by the United Nations as the ‗Al-Qa‘idah 
                                                 
6
 Full text of Tony Blair‟s speech to the Labour Party conference in Brighton, 28 Sept. 
2004, BBC News, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk_politics/3697434.stm, accessed Jan. 
2010. 
7
 Blair‟s speech to Labour Party conference in Brighton, 28 Sept. 2004. 
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pyramidical structure‘ in 2002.8 This of course illustrates another facet of the ‗naming‘ 
problem: even spellings of ‗AQ‘ have varied in western and in British literature over 
time. 
 
The network threat 
Following analysis of the war in Afghanistan in 2001, a strand of thinking developed to 
suggest that Al-Qaeda was or had become not a centralized structure, but rather a 
network. Some, such as Alia Brahimi, argued that there had been a transition, from a 
centralized structure to a network, and that in this transition the seeds of Al-Qaeda‘s 
destruction could be found, for the network model would lead to more innocent Muslim 
deaths at the hands of Al-Qaeda that would not be possible to justify, either ideologically 
or theologically.
9
 
 At the centre of the debate between AQ Central and the network approach has 
been the battle of wills between Bruce Hoffman and Marc Sageman, two highly respected 
American analysts—a battle of wills followed in great detail by counterterrorism policy 
officials in London. The argument is not about whether there is a central leadership for 
Al-Qaeda, of course, but about the extent to which it is operationally relevant, both in 
terms of managing and delivering terrorist attacks, and in terms of the degree to which it 
is able to recruit new members directly to its cause. Doubts as to its operational control 
emerged soon after the Taleban fell from power in Afghanistan, given the sheer weight of 
killing and disruption of structures that had taken place with the American bombardment 
of the country. This moved the focus onto its ideological leadership: as Rohan Gunaratna 
put it in 2005, ‗Although the operational capability of al Qaeda has severely weakened 
                                                 
8
 United Nations Security Council, letter dated 22 Aug. 2002 from the Chairman of the 
Monitoring Group established pursuant to Resolution 1390 (2002) addressed to the 
Chairman of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to Resolution 1267 
(1999) concerning Afghanistan, http://daccess-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N02/599/01/PDF/N0259901.pdf?, accessed {?} Jan. 2010. 
9
 Alia Brahimi, „Crushed in the shadows: why Al Qaeda will lose the war of ideas‟, 
Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 33: 2, Feb. 2010, pp. 93–110. 
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during the past four years, the ideology of global jihad articulated by Bin Laden and his 
group serves as a catalyst for 30–40 Asian, Middle Eastern and African jihad groups and 
for numerous cells in the West.‘10 AQ Central may not decide on targets, but according to 
this argument it worked to inspire others. 
 Marc Sageman‘s Understanding terror networks, published in 2004, was an 
important volume whose core thesis was, in policy circles, a slow burner.
11
 Sageman 
suggested that it was wrong to see Al-Qaeda as a pyramidical organization. An 
organization of this sort could be destroyed in a systematic way, mostly through the use 
of the military. In contrast, he argued that Al-Qaeda was better understood as a social 
network, and networks cannot be destroyed—they have to be disrupted. This is the 
essence of the distinction between a model of a threat from ‗AQ Central‘ and that of a 
threat from a ‗network‘. When Sageman followed up with Leaderless jihad, there was a 
much more receptive environment for his argument that the threat did not emanate from a 
centralized leadership with real resources as well as command and control capabilities, 
but lay in the capacity to inspire locally formed groups, who were making their 
operational decisions locally.
12
 Bruce Hoffman objected to this analysis. Putting forward 
the ‗AQ Central‘ thesis, he argued, contra Sageman, that defeating Al-Qaeda ‗will 
require a dual strategy of systematically destroying and weakening enemy capabilities—
that is, continuing to kill or capture senior al Qaeda leaders—and breaking the cycle of 
terrorist recruitment . . . Only by destroying the organization‘s leadership and disrupting 
                                                 
10
 Rohan Gunaratna, „Ideology in terrorism and counterterrorism: lessons from combating 
Al Qaeda and Al Jemaah Al Islamiyah in Southeast Asia‟, CSRC{?} discussion paper 
05/42, Sept. 2005, p. 2, 
http://kms2.isn.ethz.ch/serviceengine/Files/ESDP/44015/ichaptersection_singledocument
/0D07F910-03A4-4CC7-86EA-5B754A6E04FA/en/07.pdf, accessed {?} Jan. 2010. 
11
 Marc Sageman, Understanding terror networks (Philadelphia: University of 
Pennsylvania Press, 2004). 
12
 Marc Sageman, Leaderless jihad: terror networks in the twenty first century 
(Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2008). 
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the continued resonance of its radical message can the United States and its allies defeat 
al Qaeda.‘13 
 The debate between the two analysts was in a sense a classic American argument, 
with positions staked out and a rush to emphasize difference rather than agreement. As an 
aside in the exchange between the two, Sageman notes that ‗our [that is, Sageman‘s and 
Hoffman‘s] practical recommendations are not that far apart‘.14 Sageman had not argued 
that Al-Qaeda had been defeated; rather, he had suggested that Al-Qaeda 
 
put out inspirational guidance on the Internet, but it does not have the means to exert command 
and control over the al Qaeda social network. The surviving members of al Qaeda are 
undoubtedly still plotting to do harm to various countries in the world and have the expertise to 
do so, but they are hampered by the global security measures that have been put in place.
15
 
 
Nevertheless, through this debate British policy-makers were faced with a choice, 
particularly because Hoffman raised the stakes. It was no longer sufficient to believe that 
AQ Central had been shattered on the battlefields of Afghanistan in 2001: Hoffman 
argued that ‗al Qaeda Central had reconstituted itself in Pakistan‘s tribal frontier areas 
and from that base was again actively directing and initiating international terrorist 
operations on a grand scale‘.16 Two understandings of the threat had come directly into 
                                                 
13
 Bruce Hoffman, „The myth of grass-roots terrorism: why Osama bin Laden still 
matters‟, Foreign Affairs 00: 0{?}, May–June 2008, pp. 000–00{?}, 
http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/63408/bruce-hoffman/the-myth-of-grass-roots-
terrorism?page=3, accessed {?} Jan. 2010. 
14
 Marc Sageman, „Does Osama still call the shots? Debating the containment of al 
Qaeda‟s leadership‟, Foreign Affairs 00: 0, July–Aug. 2008, pp. 00–0, 
http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/64460/marc-sageman-and-bruce-hoffman/does-
osama-still-call-the-shots?page=2, accessed {?} Jan. 2010.{?} 
15
 Sageman, Leaderless jihad, p. 132. 
16
 Bruce Hoffmann, „Does Osama still call the shots? Debating the containment of al 
Qaeda‟s leadership‟, Foreign Affairs 00: 0, July–Aug. 2008, pp. 000–00{?}, 
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confrontation, prescribing two different routes of response: maintain the importance of 
the AQ Central narrative, or focus more on the notion of a grass-roots, leaderless terrorist 
threat. 
 Meanwhile, others such as Olivier Roy noted that ‗networks are both international 
and founded on strict personal relations between members. They unite globalisation and 
the esprit de corps of people that know each other well.‘17 Taking a different reading, 
Fawaz Gerges suggested that Al-Qaeda should be seen as one network within a broader 
Salafi–Jihadi movement.18 Furthermore, offshoots of this debate have led to further 
analysis of the small groups, and cliques, or of an enclave ‗of like-minded people, prone 
to polarisation of visions, views and interpretations of the world‘.19 Such thinking was 
important in the development of a threat narrative associated with converts and home-
grown threats.
20
 
 
The home-grown threat 
The third narrative was catapulted to the fore in public debate by the attacks in London in 
July 2005. The cause of the ‗home-grown threat‘ was much discussed. In retrospect, 
Marc Sageman for one was clear: ‗Iraq is the moment when British jihadists started 
                                                                                                                                                 
http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/64460/marc-sageman-and-bruce-hoffman/does-
osama-still-call-the-shots?page=2, accessed {?} Jan. 2010. 
17
 Olivier Roy, „Al-Qaeda: a true global movement‟, in Rik Coolsaet, ed., Jihadi 
terrorism and the radicalisation challenge in Europe (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2008), p. 112. 
18
 Fawaz Gerges, The far enemy: why jihad went global (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2005). 
19
 Jocelyne Cesari, „Muslims in Europe and the risk of radicalism‟, in Coolsaet, Jihadi 
terrorism and the radicalisation challenge in Europe, p. 104. 
20
 This is perhaps most marked in the strategy of „Prevent‟, one of the four strands of the 
UK CONTEST counterterrorist strategy. 
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focusing on attacks inside the UK.‘21 But other accounts did not come to the same 
conclusion. Tony Blair asserted that ‗we must reject the thought that somehow we are the 
authors of our own distress; that if only we altered this decision or that, the extremism 
would fade away‘.22 In July 2005, the authors of a Chatham House briefing paper argued: 
 
There is no doubt that the situation over Iraq has imposed particular difficulties for the UK, and 
for the wider coalition against terrorism. It gave a boost to the Al-Qaeda network‘s propaganda, 
recruitment and fundraising . . . provided an ideal targeting and training area for Al-Qaeda-linked 
terrorists . . . Riding pillion with a powerful ally has proved costly in terms of British and US 
military lives, Iraqi lives, military expenditure, and the damage caused to the counter-terrorism 
campaign.
23
 
 
The response of the then Foreign Secretary, Jack Straw, was to equate such analysts with 
apologists for terror: 
 
I‘m astonished if Chatham House is now saying that we should not have stood shoulder to 
shoulder with our long standing allies in the United States. But let me also say this, the time for 
excuses for terrorism [is] over, the terrorists have struck across the world in countries allied with 
the United States, backing the war in Iraq and in countries which had nothing whatever to do with 
the war in Iraq.
24
 
                                                 
21
 Sageman, quoted in Mehdi Hasan, „The bulletproof case against Blair‟, New 
Statesman, 28 Jan. 2010, http://www.newstatesman.com/uk-politics/2010/02/iraq-war-
invasion-blair-regime, accessed {?} Jan. 2010. 
22
 Tony Blair, „Clash about civilizations‟, speech given in{?} London, 21 March 2006, 
http://www.number10.gov.uk/output/Page9224.asp, accessed {?} Oct. 2006. 
23
 Paul Wilkinson and Frank Gregory{?}, in „Security, terrorism and the UK‟, briefing 
paper, Chatham House and the New Security Challenges Programme, July 2005, 
http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/research/security/papers/view/-/id/301/, accessed {?} 
Jan. 2010. 
24
 Jack Straw, „Straw: time for excuses for terrorism over (18/07/2005)‟, edited transcript 
of the Foreign Secretary‟s words on BBC News 24, Monday 18 July, 2005, 
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 The home-grown threat narrative was particularly chilling, pointing to British 
citizens acting as a ‗fifth column‘ in ‗our‘ midst. The leader of the 7/7 attacks, the suicide 
bomber Mohammed Siddique Khan, spoke in a broad Yorkshire accent in his ‗martyr‘s 
testimony‘. A government adviser advanced the view that one in five British Muslims 
‗may‘ support militant jihadi violence.25 These elements coalesced into a view that, as 
Tony Blair put it, the home-grown radicals ‗may have been born here. But . . . [the] 
ideology wasn‘t. And that is why it has to be taken on, everywhere.‘26 
 For Blair, the ideology and indeed the operation were products of AQ Central. 
But for others, the home-grown threat was could not be separated from the network 
threat. As Roy noted: ‗We have seen that young westerners went to countries to fight the 
jihad and came back to Europe to commit terrorist acts. But these networks can function 
both ways, without us being able to talk about a point of departure and a final point.‘27 
The focus on the movement of people to and from jihadi theatres sheds some light on 
networks, but it fails to address other elements of threat narratives, especially those 
focusing on the home-grown nature of the threat. 
 Of course, it would be strange to suggest that the home-grown threat had no links 
to other ways of thinking about the threat, such as that of a ‗network‘. But it also had 
distinctive elements. That is, the home-grown threat is not purely derived from a 
(mis)reading of Islam. Over three weekends in 1999, David Copeland, the infamous nail 
bomber, killed three people and injured 129 not to further ‗jihad‘, but to attempt to 
                                                                                                                                                 
http://www.fco.gov.uk/resources/en/news/2005/07/fco_not_180705_strawchathamhse, 
accessed {?} Jan. 2010. 
25
 This figure is attributed to Haras Rafiq, „an adviser to the Government‟s preventing 
extremism taskforce‟, in James Slack, „One in 11 British Muslims backs suicide bombers, 
says Brown aide‟, Daily Mail, 2 Aug. 2007, http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-
472791/One-11-British-Muslims-backs-suicide-bombers-says-Brown-aide.html, accessed 
{?} Jan. 2010. 
26
 Blair „Clash about civilizations‟. 
27
 Roy, „Al-Qaeda‟, p. 113. 
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initiate a ‗race war‘ (he also, of course, attacked the gay community). As Copeland said 
in his confession to the police, ‗My aim was political. It was to cause a racial war in this 
country. There‘d be a backlash from the ethnic minorities. I‘d just be the spark. That‘s all 
I will plan to be, the spark that would set fire to this country. Chaos, damage, fire, it‘s 
okay.‘28 A home-grown terrorist, inspired by a network that was both UK-based and 
international in reach; but in this instance, rather than Islam, the inspiration was 
contemporary Nazism. Often such individuals are seen as loners; but this is to mix the 
operational with the ideological. Copeland, and indeed Timothy McVeigh in his bombing 
of Oklahoma City, may have operated as a loner, but both men were embedded 
ideologically in networks. Indeed, McVeigh outlined his motivations in a letter to Fox 
News in which he highlighted the violence at Waco (the attack occurred on the two-year 
anniversary of Waco) and the actions of the US abroad as justifications.
29
 
 
The new terrorism threat 
One of the particularly noticeable strands of thinking about threat has been a focus on the 
idea of a ‗new terrorism‘, and specifically the view that the ‗new terrorists‘ were 
fundamentally different in terms of threat from those of the past. Irish terrorism often 
gave warnings, and was connected to a political strategy. The ‗new terrorists‘, it was said, 
simply wanted to kill as many people as possible. Tony Blair was very explicit about this 
when he said: 
 
I don‘t think you can compare the political demands of republicanism with the political demands 
of this terrorist ideology we‘re facing now . . . I don‘t think the IRA would ever have set about 
trying to kill 3,000 people . . . In America, it could have been 30,000 instead of 3,000 [killed on 
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9/11] and they would prefer that. My entire thinking changed from 11 September—the belief that 
you have a different form of terrorism.
30
 
 
And the previous year, he had said: ‗The only path to take is to confront this terrorism, 
remove it root and branch and at all costs stop them acquiring the weapons to kill on a 
massive scale because these terrorists would not hesitate to use them.‘31 
 In Britain, the idea that terrorism was ‗new‘ was very much connected to the fear 
that it would be apocalyptic. John Reid{?} had said that Britain was facing ‗probably the 
most sustained period of severe threat since the end of the second world war‘, and that 
there was a new ruthless group of ‗unconstrained international terrorists‘.32 The former 
director of the British Security Service noted shortly before she retired: ‗The terrorist 
threat from AQ and related groups is, quite simply, unprecedented in scale, ambition and 
ruthlessness: they have a global reach, and they are willing to carry out mass casualty 
attacks, including suicide attacks, without warning. It remains a very real possibility that 
they may, some time, somewhere, attempt a chemical, biological, radiological or even 
nuclear attack.‘33 The Chief Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police, Sir Ian Blair, had 
also expressed this fear in a high-profile lecture: ‗Britain remains a target of the highest 
possible priority to al-Qaeda and its affiliates; we are in a new reality. The sky is dark. 
The terrorists seek mass casualties and are entirely indiscriminate: every community is at 
risk, which is the starkest of reasons why we need representatives of every community in 
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our ranks.‘34 ‗Our‘ fear has been that not only will ‗they‘ attack us, but ‗they‘ will try to 
destroy ‗us‘. 
 At one level, such fears are reasonable. Beyond contextual factors, Martha 
Crenshaw noted 30 years ago that ‗Violence and bloodshed always excite human 
curiosity, and the theatricality, suspense, and threat of danger inherent in terrorism 
enhance its attention getting qualities.‘35 The drive to gain recognition and coverage leads 
to escalation and ‗to ever more destructive and spectacular violence‘.36 The corollary 
deployed by liberal democracies includes the production of ever more frightening threat 
narratives, including those associated with apocalyptic fears. This theme has been 
conjoined with repeated references to no-warning, mass-casualty terrorism, often linked 
to suicide attacks (both person-borne and vehicle-borne), as part of a radical religious 
agenda deployed by Al-Qaeda. And so an action–reaction cycle develops: ‗they‘ want to 
threaten ‗us‘; ‗we‘ are genuinely worried about ‗their‘ determination to kill; ‗they‘ notice 
‗our‘ fears, and speak and act accordingly. 
 
Of course, these four depictions of the narratives deployed in the past decade are not 
mutually exclusive notions of threat; you can focus simultaneously on the home-grown 
threat and the new terrorism threat, for example. One can argue that the fourth narrative 
is the unifying one—that it is the commitment to a ‗new terrorism‘ that has been the key 
concern, whether the agent be considered as a centralised threat, a network threat or a 
fifth column. But what this account of differing focal points for ‗our‘ threat narratives 
illustrates is that it has been very hard to secure and maintain consensus about the precise 
nature of the threat. And that is something new; it was not a feature of the campaign 
against Irish terrorism, or, further in the past, of the debates about the threats of nuclear 
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war, or of Nazism. Then, whether you agreed with what was being said or not, the official 
position on who the challenger was, what they were called, and what they would do, was 
clear. In the past decade, such clarity has been profoundly absent. So what, if anything, is 
new about the current threats and challenges of contemporary terrorism, and how do 
these four threat narratives implicitly penetrate recent discussions about features of 
contemporary terrorism? 
 
New and old terrorism 
In the late 1990s a burgeoning literature emerged which sought to address aspects of what 
was labelled as ‗new‘ terrorism, drawing attention to a new phase, or a radically altered 
form of threat.
37
 Martha Crenshaw has argued that the literature on ‗new‘ terrorism 
assumes that the means of this terrorism are radically different; that its goals or ends are 
‗presumed to be both unlimited and non-negotiable‘; and that accounts of it are 
predicated on a reading of ‗decentralised, ―inspirational‖ and ‗diffuse‘ threats, rather than 
a phenomenon orchestrated by an orthodox entity or organization.
38
 Crenshaw notes that 
the effect of 9/11 had a huge impact, akin to the North Korean invasion of South Korea, 
inasmuch as it cemented ‗the ideas behind interpretations of threat‘ which at the time 
were focused on ‗Communism and the militarisation of containment‘.39 She further notes 
that the ‗1998 embassy bombings, the attack on the USS Cole in 2000, and the 
millennium plots strengthened the perception of a completely new threat‘.40 Crenshaw 
recognizes that the idea of new terrorism is appealing, but judges it deeply flawed in its 
assumptions. In effect, it ‗is a way of defining the threat so as to mobilise both public and 
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elite support for costly responses with long-term and uncertain pay-offs‘.41 The ‗shock‘ 
of 9/11 was a turning point, and the narrative of ‗new terrorism‘ led to a model which 
‗permits top-down processing of information‘ precisely because policy-makers ‗rely on 
metaphors, narratives and analogies that make sense of what otherwise {?} be difficult to 
understand, if not incomprehensible‘.42 While this is certainly the case, it is interesting to 
note that much of the work on ‗new terrorism‘ predates the events of 9/11, and this 
recognition leads to a number of questions: in particular, what changes, if any, have 
occurred in the nature and form of contemporary terrorism, and what is new about new 
terrorism? 
 First, themes have been framed by a huge growth in the use of the media and 
more particularly the internet; an active ‗system of communication between individuals 
and between individuals and groups‘ which leads to ‗interactivity‘.43 For Sageman, it is 
this interactivity which is novel, transformative and perhaps even revolutionary, when 
considering contemporary terror threats. He notes that the ‗the intensity of feelings 
developed online rival those developed offline‘.44 Computer-mediated communication 
‗seems to collapse time and eliminate space‘ and ‗has the potential to transform human 
relationships faster and to an even greater degree‘, a point illustrated by the fact that 
‗some networks were created wholesale from forums, which radicalized their 
members‘.45 The use of information and communication technologies and the associated 
electronic networks became a central strategic tool of Al-Qaeda, differentiating it from 
earlier phases of terrorism.
46
 
 Groups and networks can raise and even construct awareness about the plight and 
suffering of peoples in different parts of the world, particularly through videos which can 
be streamed online. This has led to the creation of new patterns of recruitment—both 
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passive and active—and the exploitation of propaganda opportunities by radical groups. 
The shift in the coverage of events from the print media and television to digital media 
has transformed the context in which terrorism and insurgencies, counterterrorism and 
counterinsurgency are understood and analysed.
47
 One outcome has been a return to 
discussions about ‗the terrain of the electronic media . . . the kind of immediacy and 
visual impact you get from television‘.48 To an even greater extent, the shift from the 
visual{?} simply to the use of symbols—certain gestures and evocative labels, sounds and 
motifs—may perhaps reflect a further transformation of the use of imagery by particular 
groups. Online coverage—both in chat forums and through the filming of particular 
attacks—gives the virtual community the opportunity to send messages of support and 
visceral, even graphic, anti-western motifs and mantras. Two young men from Derby—
Asif Hanif and Omar Khan Sharif—attempted to detonate explosives in a café in Tel 
Aviv in an apparent suicide attack, in support of the actions of Hamas, on 30 April 2003, 
after making martyr videos.
49
 Both, from Pakistani families based in the UK, were 
disenfranchised—dislocated from their local social communities.50 Such people are now 
able, as they were not in the past, to travel with relative ease from their homes to different 
conflict zones to commit acts of terrorism, or to gain training, or to learn more about the 
‗cause‘. 
 Digital media and travel are important, but a further dimension of the 
opportunities provided through globalization to radical violent groups is the 
hybridization{?} of insurgency and terrorism. At the forefront of the hybridization of 
insurgency was the conflict in the North Caucasus. Ibn Khattab, the leader of the Arab 
mujahedin in Chechnya, had led a group of Arab fighters in the post-Soviet civil war in 
Tajikistan, having trained in Afghanistan as a young mujahid; he, along with his 
                                                 
47
 David Kilcullen, The accidental guerrilla: fighting small wars in the midst of a big one 
(London: Hurst, 2009). 
48
 Brian Michael Jenkins, „Terrorism: a contemporary problem with age-old dilemmas‟, 
in{?} Terrorism: roots, impact, responses (London: Praeger, 1992), p. 16. 
49
 http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/3543269.stm, accessed {?} March 2010. 
50
 http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2003/may/01/israel5, accessed {?} March 2010. 
 20 
erstwhile Chechen supporters, was at the forefront of this transformation of insurgency.
51
 
Together they presaged the new, being part of a generation of jihadi fighters and 
ideologues who exploited the growing influence of both media technologies and post-
Cold War globalization. Khattab‘s integration into the Chechen military formations was 
not simply an enforced union, in which he and his close unit of supporters became an 
appendage to nationalist and separatist Chechen forces. Rather, Khattab was received in 
1995 by a radical Jordanian–Chechen Islamist named Shaykh Ali Fathi al-Shishani (Fathi 
Mohammed Habib), and together they advanced a reading of defensive jihad which 
resonated with small groups of local volunteers and found purchase in other circles of 
volunteers from the Chechen diaspora.
52
 With a pan-Caucasian ideology, Khattab and 
Shamil Basayev embraced new media technologies, including the use of camcorders. In 
the build-up to the outbreak of the second Russo-Chechen War in 1999, Khattab and 
local benefactors established a series of multilingual audio and visual portals for the Arab 
mujahedin in Chechnya, alongside websites through which to publicize the actions of his 
group and send messages to the outside world through the online community, effectively 
setting a precedent for ‗jihad through the media‘.53 Their actions indicate that 
globalization had not only enabled groups to use the media in novel ways, shaping the 
insurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan, but had also enabled people to travel between 
different theatres with greater ease. Insurgency, and the related use of terrorism, was 
becoming hybridized—a process that gained momentum after the events of 9/11. 
 As a result of greater access to the media and changes in broadcasting (for 
example, the introduction of podcasts), new interfaces have been created between local 
communities and larger regional and global narratives. This enables different audiences 
to access websites, which are increasingly sophisticated. The use of chat rooms, web 
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forums and live feeds, and the streaming and dissemination of audio-visual messages, 
extend the reach of small groups, establishing new online networks and communities. 
This feeds directly into the hybridization of terrorism with information, sermons and 
fatwas, as well as other messages being posted online. The reshaping of Al-Qaeda, 
especially against the backdrop of the war in Iraq, enabled it to develop the leadership‘s 
long-standing interest in the media and ‗the international media in particular‘.54 
According to Sageman, ‗websites do play an important educational role in terms of 
providing information relevant for the jihadis and especially operational knowledge in the 
absence of training camps‘.55 The dissemination of detailed step-by-step video guides on 
how to make improvised explosive devices (IEDs) is one aspect of the burgeoning role of 
the internet which national and international authorities have identified as a problem.
56
 
This increased availability of online instructional content has also led to a renewed 
attempt to analyse ‗self-radicalization‘, in which individuals or groups actively seek out 
and engage with radical groups through the internet. Perhaps the most marked example of 
this phenomenon in the UK was the failed attack in Exeter by Nicky Reilly. News reports 
indicated that 
 
He is thought to have met British-based Muslim radicals in internet cafés near his council home, 
which he shared with his mother. Security sources said that radicals encouraged him to visit 
internet chat rooms and other websites, where he encountered men based in Pakistan who helped 
to mould a violent hatred of the West. He discussed with the men what his targets should be and 
they directed him to bomb-making websites.
57
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 It is unusual in a violent conflict to be unclear as to the nature of the threat faced. 
But perhaps some of that uncertainty is rooted in the times—that is, the novelty 
characteristic of the digital age, which facilitates broader globalized patterns of empathy 
and action, of information and self-radicalization, and, of course, through mobile 
communications technology, facilitates new opportunities for operational activity by 
violent groups. Five years after 7/7, these reflections on the evolution of 
counterterrorism—and its close cousin counterinsurgency—may lead to radical 
reconsiderations of the age of terror and the evolution of threat narratives. 
 
Conclusion 
The analysis and arguments in this paper have been split into two broad sections. The 
first has charted the evolution of different, indeed overlapping, threat narratives, which 
have variously been deployed to demarcate not only the boundaries of the ‗age of terror‘ 
but also western policy responses. In particular, we have drawn attention to the ways in 
which these stories about threat interpenetrate, producing an evolving discourse about the 
way counterterror strategies have become operationally and institutionally embedded in 
policy discussions in the UK. In the second part of the article we have developed this 
analysis further by showing that the strategy of terrorism remains stable but the context in 
which it is understood has led to hybridization. Thus questions about new waves, phases 
or new types of terrorism, and the focus on Al-Qaeda and the global war on terror, are 
misleading, blurring the complex evolution of and changes in the use of terrorism in a 
series of other local theatres, particularly through the use of the media by groups in places 
such as Chechnya. We have argued that terrorism—and the links between visual aspects 
of security and imagery, symbols and motifs—globalization, insurgency, and media 
technologies—Web 2.0, live video-streaming, online chat forums—now feeds directly 
into fears about ‗new‘ threats.{?} 
 Yet perhaps we should also consider not just the enemy, not just the violent 
‗other‘ out to attack soldiers and civilians, but also ourselves. Why are we so fearful of 
such groups? Nicky Reilly, the failed bombers not of 7 July 2005 but of 21 July 2005, the 
failed attack in Glasgow: brutal as these plans may have been, the outcomes show that 
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there is also a good deal of operational incompetence. This is not to call for complacency, 
but rather to suggest that perhaps our fear of contemporary terrorism is more intimately 
linked to the ‗risk society‘ than it is to strategic concerns about the future of western 
civilization. Our fear of terrorism is cultural—we see it in television series (Spooks), in 
stage plays (Alice Bartlett‘s Not in my name), obliquely in novels (J. K. Rowling‘s Harry 
Potter and the Order of the Phoenix). Pinning down what this terrorist threat is might be 
as much about reading our own fears as about understanding the plans of the enemy. 
 
